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RULES OF RECOGNITION IN THE PRIMARY 
COURTS OF ZIMBABWE: ON LAWYERS' 
REASONINGS AND CUSTOMARY LAW*
R o b e r t  B. S e i d m a n **
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Concept o f  Law,1 H. L. A. Hart argues that a developed legal 
system has as a distinguishing mark a set of rules of recognition. These 
consist of rules of law that instruct lawyers and judges what counts as 
law and what does not. They include the rules of statutory construction 
and the use of precedent. Unless at least the membeis of the State apparatus 
accept the rules of recognition without coercion, the State must 
disintegrate.
These rules seem far removed from notions of power. In the usual 
perception, no set of rules seem more “ technical” , i.e. value-free. On the 
contrary, 1 argue here that in fact they embody choices, and that choosing 
one set of rules of recognition rather than another creates different power 
relationships.
In some cases (“ clear cases” ) no disagreement exists about the 
existence and content of the applicable rule. In other cases (“ trouble 
cases” ) reasonable lawyers disagree. In the positivist perception, one 
“ true” law exists. When a judge decides a trouble case, his task becomes 
to find the true law, not to create law. In the realist perception, a trouble 
case reflects a genuine ambiguity or contradiction in the law. To the extent 
that a judge resolves a trouble case, he creates law.
Each of the perspectives understands the rules of recognition in a 
different way. For positivists, the rules of recognition should prescribe 
an agenda appropriate to finding the true law. For the realist, they should 
provide an agenda appropriate to intelligent law-creating.
! The positivists make two charges against the realists. They say that 
When a judge creates law he steps out of his role and arrogates a power 
that his role denies him. They claim that, because law-creating depends 
on individual values, the realist perspective makes law unpredictable. Only 
if the judge limits his role to law-finding, they say, can a litigant confidently 
predict the result. In this paper I argue to the contrary: when a judge 
decides cases following a positivist perspective, he creates law without
* This article was first published in the International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 32, 
1983, pp. 871-903 and is printed here with their permission.
** Professor of Law and Political Science, Boston University, and former Visiting Professor of 
Law, University of Zimbabwe. For criticisms and suggestions, I am indebted to Doris 
Peterson Galen, Geoffrey Feltoe, Kempton Makamure, Sterwart Cant and Max Lambiris.
H. L. A. Hart, The Concept o f  Law  (1962).
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revealing that he does so, or exposing his argument to criticism. By 
pretending that he does not create law, he maximises his power to create 
law. The positivist, not the realist perspective, merits the positivist critique 
of realism.
During the pre-independence period, positivism dominated Zimbabwe’s 
courts that decided appeals in customary law cases. In that period white 
Native (later District) Commissioners and an all white (and all male) 
Appeals Court2 decided customary law trouble cases. The Native 
Commissioners assumed that they knew “ the native mind’’ and, therefore, 
the customary law. (A noted Rhodesian anthropologist, however, thought 
their knowledge superficial.)3 4The Court of Appeals for Native Civil 
Cases until 1969 did not contain a lawyer. Its judges too assumed they 
knew “ the native mind’’. In deciding trouble cases, they determined the 
contenc of customary law, although in practice they lived far removed from 
African society. By using a positivist set of rules of recognition, these 
distant white judges maximised their power over the content of customary 
law.
Seidman, Customary Law Rules o f  Recognition
After independence, the Customary Law and Primary Courts Act 
1981 revolutionised the whole system of customary law courts. Implicit 
in the new Act lies a change in power relationships. Now, in a sense, a 
judge must share his power with the litigants. No longer ought a court 
create a law under the pretence of finding the law.
This article examines first the problem that trouble case rules of 
recognition purport to solve, and suggests a conceptual framework for 
the study. In the next two parts the paper examines explanations for trouble 
cases in general and customary law. In the fifth part, it examines in some 
detail the rules of recognition developed by the old Rhodesian customary 
law appeal courts. Finally, .1 propose a set of rules of recognition for 
customary law cases. I do not discuss here rules of internal conflicts.
II. THE DIFFICULTY: TROUBLE CASES IN CUSTOMARY LAW
In some customary law cases, the parties make contrary claims of law. 
In Mativenga and Mamire v Chinamura,* for example, the plaintiff’s 
cattle wandered on the defendants’ lands. To punish the cattle, the 
defendants’ two nine-year old sons drove 13 head over a cliff. The plaintiff 
claimed damages from their fathers, asserting that Shona customary law 
held a father liable for the delicts of his child. The defendants asserted 
that Shona customary law held a father liable only for the delicts of his 
child committed whilst the child acts as a servant of the father. The court 
upheld the plaintiff’s claim.
2' The name varied from time to time: 1928-1964, The Native Appeal Court, Southern Rhodesia;
1965-1981, the Court of Appeal for African Civil Cases.
3' J.F. Holleman, “ Disputes and Uncertainties in African Law and Jurisdiction: A Rhodesian 
Case Study”  (1979) 17 A f. L. Stud 1.
4- [1928-19621 SRN  829; [1937-1962] SRN  S3 (1968).
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To understand the function of an appellate court in such a case, it 
seems helpful to draw an analogy between a lawsuit and a syllogism.5 A 
syllogism states a relationship of subsumption:
Major premise: All men are mortal (i.e. have the quality of 
mortality).
Minor premise: Socrates is a man.
Conclusion: Socrates is mortal.
One can analyse a lawsuit by analogy, to the syllogist form. In that analogy, 
the rule of law constitutes the major premise, the facts in the case, the 
minor premise, and the judgement, the conclusion. One might analyse 
Mativenga’s case, for example, thus:
Major premise: A father should pay damages for the delicts 
of his child, whether or not the child acted 
as his father’s servant.
Minor premise: The defendant’s children committed a delict 
by driving the plaintiff’s cattle over a cliff. 
Conclusion: The defendants should pay damages to the
plaintiff.
In most customary law as in most general law cases, the parties agree upon 
the major premise that the court ought to invoke. They differ about the 
facts (i.e. the minor premise), not the law. These we call “ clear cases” . 
Appellate cases, however, mainly deal with issues of law, that is to say, 
disputes about the major premise. In those cases — “ trouble cases”  — 
the parties assert contradictory major premises. For example, in 
Mativenga‘s case, these consisted of:
P laintiffs major premise: A father should pay damages for
the delicts of his child, whether 
or not the child acted as his 
father’s servant.
Defendant’s major premise: A father should pay for the
delict of his child if, but only if, 
the child was then acting as his 
father’s servant.
Given the facts (or minor premise) of that case, these two inconsistent 
alternative major premises lead to equally inconsistent, alternative 
judgments. One can analyse in the same way every trouble case — and 
every appellate case involving an issue of law constitutes a trouble case.
Where an issue of law falls for decision, the court must in effect 
choose between competing major premises. What rules of recognition 
should a court use in deciding a customary law trouble case?
5' See R.B. Seidman, The Judicial Process. Reconsidered in Light of the Role Theory”  (1969) 32 
516.
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The rules of recognition, of course, constitute rules of law. All sensible 
answers to the question — what rules of law ought a court to invoke in 
particular sorts of cases? — must rest upon an identification of the 
difficulty, and its causes, i.e. its explanation. Unless we discuss causes, 
the rules of law we propose are likely only to poultice symptoms.6 1 will 
begin by describing trouble cases in general law, the competing 
explanations for them, and the corresponding, competing rules of 
recognition that purport to solve them.
III. THE CAUSE AND CURE OF TROUBLE CASES IN 
GENERAL LAW
Zimbabwe’s basic rule of recognition appears in the Constitution:
Subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force 
in Zimbabwe relating to the application of African customary 
law, the law to be administered by the High Court and by any 
courts in Zimbabwe subordinate to the High Court shall be the 
law in force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on 10th 
June 1891, as modified by subsequent legislation having in 
Zimbabwe the force of law.7 *
General law consists of written law. The law of the Cape Colony appears 
in written case reports, statutes and subsidiary legislation; so does 
“ subsequent legislation’’. Section 89 commands a court to discover the 
applicable general law by searching the books. That matches elementary 
notions of the rule of law: the law must pre-exist the transaction (for the 
books pre-exist the transaction), and it must be “ cogniscible”  (Bentham’s 
invented word), meaning that a citizen can discover it before entering upon 
a transaction. Every trouble case casts doubts upon the central proposition 
that the general law matches these requirements of the rule of law. In a 
trouble case, by definition, a citizen could not discover in advance what 
law applied to a contemplated transaction — for if reasonable lawyers 
quarrel about the applicable law, how should a layman know what law 
applies? If only after the fact a court resolves the question of what law 
applies, does it not actually apply the law ex post facto?
To understand how courts have or should resolve an issue, one must 
first understand the causes of difficulty. Lawyers in effect put forward 
two alternative accounts for trouble cases in the general law. One, the 
positivist explanation, assumes a proposition of fact: The common law 
never changes. It always exists, implicit in the books, awaiting discovery 
by a truly learned court that correctly follows the rules of recognition. 
In Central African Airways v Vickers-Armstronf# the plaintiffs sought 
to attach the property of the defendants in order to found jurisdiction 
in an action for the loss of an aircraft that crashed, allegedly because of 
the defendants’ faulty construction. Before 1931 in such a case Cape
6 See R.B. Seidman, State, Law and Development (1978), Chap. 3.
7' Constitution (Zimbabwe) 1980, s. 89.
*• [19S6] R *  N 4.
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Colony law refused an attachment. A 1931 case,9 however, upset the old 
rule and granted attachment. In 1956, which law ought the then Rhodesian 
court to follow? The rule of recognition then did not differ from today’s 
section 89. If the court must follow the law of Cape Colony as it stood 
in 1891, it would deny the application for attachment. If it followed the 
law of the Cape Colony as it stood in 1956, it would grant the attachment. 
It adopted the latter course, but carefully asserted that the 1931 case did 
not change the law of the Cape Colony. “ A practice,” it said, “ later shown 
to be erroneous, cannot be regarded as the law in force in 1891; the true 
law must be looked to .” 10
The positivist view holds that in a trouble case one major premise 
states the“ true law” . The other simply constitutes error. The true law exists 
in the books whatever vagueness or contradictions the books seem to 
reveal. Positive law exists; the court has the task of finding it.
That view resonates easily with Austinian jurisprudence. Austin 
maintained that law constitutes the command of the sovereign, a 
thundering challenge to the then prevailing natural law tenets. The jurist 
only needs to discover the true content of that command — i.e. the “ true 
law” . The “ true law” constitutes a social fact; it exists. In deciding a 
trouble case, as in deciding'a clear case, the judge never makes a normative 
choice. He never creates law. He finds it.
In that view, the rules for the use of precedent and the rules of 
statutory interpretation constitute guides in the search for “ true law” . 
The same set of rules of recognition serve in clear as in trouble cases. 
Properly used, they can lead to one and only one correct result. Whatever 
the result, the judge takes no moral or political responsibility for it. He 
has no policy, save to discover the sovereign’s command — the true law.
Arf alternative explanation for trouble cases in general law, the realist 
view, asserts that they flow from the very nature of language and of law. 
Language has by its nature a core meaning and a penumbra. Suppose an 
ordinance stated: “ Vehicles are forbidden in the park.” That plainly 
forbids an automobile. A parks director who admitted Mercedes 
automobiles but not Austins would equally plainly violate the law. Would 
he violate the law if he permitted a person on a motor-driven wheel chair 
(also arguably a vehicle) to use the park? Given our common, acculturated 
understanding of the purpose of ordinance, an automobile falls within 
the core meaning o f the word “ vehicle” . A motor-driven wheelchair, 
however, falls in the penumbra. Reasonable lawyers could easily argue 
over its inclusion in the word “ vehicle” . An analogous difficulty arises 
when the books contain two rules of law that contradict each other.
In the realist view, therefore, not error in finding the true law, but the 
very nature of language and law explains the existence of trouble cases. 
Trouble cases do not arise because somebody asserts an erroneous claim 
of law. They arise because the inherent nature of law and language make
*• Halse » Warwick, 1931 CPD 233.
10 Ibid p. 8; emphasis added.
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inevitable cases in which reasonable lawyers could not agree about the 
applicability of a rule to a given set of facts.11
In the positivist view, if lawyers disagree about the major premise 
that controls a particular lawsuit, one has the right of the matter, and 
the other the wrong. In the realist perspective, one has the wiser side, the 
other the less wise. Because in a trouble case no such thing as “ true law” 
exists in choosing between major premises, a judge to that extent makes 
law. He makes a normative choice — and every normative choice constitues 
a policy choice. He must decide what the law ought to be. For that, of 
course, the judge must take moral and political responsibility.
Like trouble cases themselves the realist view profoundly disturbs 
many lawyers bred in the positivist tradition. It seemingly violates the very 
notion of the rule of law. It tells us that, in cases falling in the penumbra 
of statutes or between two contradictory rules, nobody could know the 
law in advance. In those cases, the court decides the law that governs the 
case ex post facto. Those consequences, however, arise not because of 
the perversity of judges, but from the nature of law and language.
Seidmart, Customary Law Rules o f Recognition
It seems bad enough that trouble cases coerce judges into the 
law-making enterprise. How can judges be prevented from going further, 
and creating law even when no real dispute about the law exists? To prevent 
that, a set of trouble case rules of recognition exists. These demonstrate 
that a proposed alternative major premise has a close enough connection 
with the written case law to permit a court to select it as the rule of law 
to control this and all similar cases. In the realist perspective, the rules 
of precedent and statutory interpretation have that office.
The difference between the positivist and the realist perspectives must 
appear, therefore, in the secondary rules concerning precedent and 
statutory interpretation. The positivist perspective requires clear-cut. 
coherent rules of recognition to make possible the discovery of “ true law” . 
The realist perspective requires contradictory rules, to make possible the 
development of permissible but contradictory alternative major premises. 
On that, the realist perspective has the advantage. Every law student 
quickly becomes cynical about the rules concerning the use of precedent 
and statutory construction. PJis lecturers solemnly tell him that obiter dicta 
have no binding force. Courts solemnly so repeat — when they want to 
get rid of an unwelcome precedent.12 When they want to follow some 
chance statement in an earlier case, the cautions about the use of obiter 
dicta suddenly disappear. If it favours a position a later judge wants to 
take, a judge’s over-the-shoulder quip suddenly becomes engraved in 
stone.13 A court that today invokes the mischief rule of statutory 
interpretation14 tomorrow follows the mischief rule’s very opposite, the 
literal rule.15
1L Seidman, op. cil. supra n.S.
12 See e.g. R v Phillips Diary (Pty.) Ltd., 1955 (4) SA 120.
*3' See e.g. Fellner v Minister o f  the Interior, 1954 (4) SA 523, 535.
14 Commissioner o f  Taxes v Ferera, 1976 (2) SA 653 (RAD) (per Macdonald JP).
15' Hussey v Rhodesia Conscientious Objector Board, 1977 RLR 92 (per Macdonald JP).
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If one examines the rules of recognition in trouble cases, expecting 
to find there the clarity that the positivist perspective predicts, one begins 
to think of the law as silly putty. No wonder law schools produce cynics.
If, on the other hand, because of the very nature of language and 
law, fact situations must inevitably arise that generate trouble cases, then 
in some cases the rules of recognition must lead to contradictory results. 
Far from the rules of recognition defining an unreal positivist heaven, with 
a fixed, cogniscible and determinable law, ascertainable as a matter of 
fact, one can identify a trouble case precisely because in it the rules of 
recognition yield not one but two possible major premises. A judge may 
not adopt as a major premise a rule of substantive law that he cannot 
by the rules of precedent and statutory interpretation link up to the clear 
written law. If he can link up, not one, but more that one such major 
premise, he faces a trouble case. Then he must choose. Thus, the very 
contraries of the rules of precedent and statutory interpretation — i.e. 
the trouble case rules of recognition — warrants the realist perspective.
In the positivist perspective, the rules of recognition suffice for the 
judge to find the “ true law” . They seemingly require no policy choice 
by the judge. To make a policy while claiming not to do so insulates the 
policy-maker from accountability. In the realist perspective, on the 
contrary, the rules of recognition instruct the judge when he cannot avoid 
making a policy. He must choose between alternative permissible rules 
of law. If a trouble case arises because no “ true law” exists, waiting to 
be discovered, then the judge who follows the realist perspective should 
make a policy decision by an agenda of steps appropriate to making a 
policy decision, not by pretending merely to find the true law. He must 
take moral and political responsibility for his choice. To that extent he 
becomes accountable. Accountability cabins power.
IV. POSITIVIST AND REALIST PERSPECTIVES OF CUSTOMARY
LAW
Positivist and realist perspectives exist also in customary law. As with 
respect to general law, they yield different kinds of rules of recognition 
and power relationships.
Unlike general law, customary law does not exist in the books. The 
Customary Law and PrimaiV Courts Act 1981 defines it as “ the customary 
law of the indigenous people of Zimbabwe or any section or 'community 
thereof’.16 That law exists in their minds and behaviour. Section 5 of the 
Act provides that, if a court has a doubt about the existence or content 
of a rule of customary law, it may consider the submissions of a party, 
and his “ evidence thereof” , and also consult among other “ lawful 
sources” , published case reports, textbooks and opinions. Even the written 
sources of law among these, however, do not constitute “ sources” of law 
in the customary law as a code of Shona customary law. A textbook can
16. s 2.
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only serve as evidence of the law. Oral opinions about the law, too, can 
constitute no more than evidence of the law. What section 5 calls “ sources 
of law” constitute no more that evidence of the law that animates the minds 
and motivates the behaviour of the people.
One can discover through evidence a “ true” rule of customary law 
only if substantial consensus exists in the community about its existence 
and content. If that existed, one could find the true rule of customary 
law just as one can discover any othe fact at issue in a lawsuit. If a case 
involved a dispute over the existence of a public right of way across private 
land, one might take evidence of whether people used the right of way 
without the owner’s explicit permission for the necessary prescriptive 
period.17 Analogously, some argue, by examining the evidence, one can 
find the “ true”  customary law.
Underpinning the positivist perception of general law lay a particular 
assumption about the nature of written law. Underpinning the positivist 
perception of customary law lay a particular assumption about the nature 
of society. Social science has long contained two contradictory models 
of society, the consensus and the conflict models. The consensus model 
assumes that practically everybody in society has the same basic values 
and attitudes. In the course of growing up, the right-minded citizen has 
his head stuffed with a whole set of norms and values that together make 
up his consciousness. Since we all live in the same society, we all undergo 
the same socialisation, and we all therefore adhere to the same sets of 
norms and values.
Given a consensus perspective of society, the positivist perspective 
of customary law necessarily follows. The content of the common 
consensus on the law constitutes an ascertainable fact. If the parties to 
a lawsuit assert contradictory major premises, only one of them can 
embody the common consensus at any time. As in general law, the judge’s 
task becomes to find the law, not to make it.
A contrary explanation f jr  customary law we call the realist 
perspective. That perspective rests upon the conflict model of society. 
Society, that model holds, may have a general consensus on some 
generalised notions — murder is a bad thing, or a father should receive 
damages for the seduction of an unmarried virgin daughter who becomes 
pregnant. Frequently, however, when one asks more particular questions, 
that consensus evaporates. Does it constitute murder to kill a wife caught 
in the act of adultery? Does it constitute seduction (with damages to the 
father)18 or adultery (with damages to the husband) to have intercourse 
with a woman after betrothal but before solemnisation of the marriage?19
Seidman, Customary Law Rules o f Recognition
1 • An early Ghanaian case, Welbeck v Brown (1884) Sar FCL 185 (Gold Coast, 1882), later 
overruled, actually held that, to prove a rule of customary law in Ghana, one had to prove its 
existence since “ time immemorial” , defined (as in English common law) as since 1189 A.D.
18 See e.g. Chiid, History and Extent o f  Recognition o f  Tribal Law in Rhodesia (1965), p. 127.
,s Ibid. p. 131.
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Other reasons help explain customary law trouble cases. While all 
rules have core meanings and penumbras, the langua'ge used may extend 
or reduce the penumbra. A statute making it an offence to.travel at an 
“ unreasonable’' speed will have more penumbral cases than one that makes 
it illegal “ to exceed 80 kilometres an hour” . Customary law rules 
ineluctably have large penumbras. Because they do not appear in writing, 
disagreement always exists on the language in which to express them.
Customary law dispute settlement institutions, too, usually rely on 
compromise solutions, not the more or less inflexible application of a rule. 
A precise rule does not serve very well the cause of compromise. Customary 
law rules, therefore, had broad penumbras because of the rules’ function 
in customary dispute settlement.20 The conflict view of society and the 
nature of customary law rules and institutions explain the existence of 
customary law trouble cases.
As does its counterpart with respect to general law, the realist 
customary law perspective explains trouble cases not as the consequence 
of error, but built into the very stuff of the legal order. In general law, 
trouble cases arise from the nature of written law. In customary law, they 
arise not only from the nature of oral customary law, but also from the 
nature of ineluctable conflicts in the social matrix in which customary law 
exists.
In the positivist perspective, the rules of recognition for customary 
law consist primarily of the rules appropriate for the investigation of an 
issue of fact. If witnesses disagree, one must be right, the other wrong. 
Anthropological works become important as evidence of custom — indeed, 
some judges in the past have all but elevated some textbooks into a code 
of customary law/As with respect to general law, once an appellate court 
decides that a particular rule of customary law constitutes the true law, 
the case becomes a binding precedent.
The realist perspective takes a contrary view. It accepts that in many 
cases parties will agree on the rule. In that case, the facts fall within a 
core meaning about which no disagreement exists. It also assumes, 
however, that in genuine contested cases, the contest reflects a genuine 
division in society about the rule of customary law. As it does with respect 
to society itself, conflict, not consensus, holds sway in customary law. 
In determining what law to apply in a trouble case, a court does not “ find” 
the true law. It must first find that two conflicting rules of customary law 
exist, and then make a policy choice between them. The rules of recognition 
far from identifying a single form of customary law, necessarily point to 
conflicting rules of law. The judge does not make a factual finding. He 
cannot avoid making a normative choice. He cannot avoid making law. 
Just as in general law, in a customary law trouble case a judge who follows 
the positivist perception wields power without accountability. If he follows
T.W. Bennet and T. Vermeulen, “ Codification of Customary Law” (1980J JAL 206, at pp. 
212-223.
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the realist model by explaining the true grounds of his policy choice, he 
submits his exercise of power to public scrutiny. To that extent he becomes 
accountable.
V. CUSTOMARY LAW TROUBLE CASE RULES OF RECOGNITON
PRIOR TO 1981
The positivists ideology holds, that there exists one true law. The realist 
ideology holds that, in a clear case, the parties cannot disagree about the 
law — that is, a consensus does exist in the society about the clear case 
rule (‘‘thou shalt not commit murder” ). To that extent, the realist and 
positivist perceptions agree. They disagree only about trouble cases.
Under Zimbabwe’s ancien regime, customary law cases arose in 
Chiefs courts and in Native (later District) Commissioners’ courts. Because 
an appeal lay from the Chiefs’to the Commissioners’ court, with a trial 
de novo the cutting edge came from the District Commissioners and the 
court to which appeals lay. Until 1972, that court consisted of the Chief 
Native Commissioner and two other senior Native Commissioners. After 
that, the Minister appointed a former High Court judge as presiding 
officer.31 In the event, white Native Commissioners and white appellate 
judges decided the content of customary law. Moreover, they did that in 
the main without the parties having legal representation. When the 
appellate court decided a case, usually it did so without hearing adversary 
counsel, and without the benefit of their researches.
In deciding upon the issues of customary law that came before them, 
with few exceptions the judges adopted the positivist perspective. I argue 
that
(1) they followed a set of trouble case rules that arose principally 
to instruct alien judges in clear cases, thus reinforcing the 
positivist notion that one true law existed in the minds and 
behaviour of the population;
(2) the very nature of the rules of recognition demonstrated their 
inappropriateness for proving the existence of the “ true” 
substantial rule; and
(3) the former appeals court for customary law cases 
manipulated the rules opportunistically to make policy 
decisions without' disclosing the true grounds for decision.
A. How the Rules Developed
The customary law rules of recognition arose to solve a practical difficulty. 
The white colonial judges served as aliens in a strange country. They had 
not grown of age in the culture of which customary law made up a segment. 
In clear as is trouble cases, they had to inform themselves about the law. 
To do that, they found an analogy in the proof of foreign law. In a case 
involving foreign law, ordinarily an English court must inform itself about 21
21 General Laws Amendment Act 1973, s.4.
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the foreign law. Typically, it does that through expert witnesses. So did 
the white colonial judges about customary law. Because it came to the 
court’s attention through witnesses, it became fashionable to talk about 
proving customary law as a matter of fact. Customary law exists in the 
minds and behaviour of people. Its discovery seemed a process of 
discovering what was the case.
In 1916, in Angu v. Attah (Gold Coast), the Privy Council stated: 
“ As is the case with all customary law, it has to be proved in 
the first instance by calling witnesses acquainted with the 
native customs until the particular customs have, by frequent 
proof, become so notorious that the courts will take judicial 
notice of them.” 22
The very process by which a court informed itself about customary law 
reinforced the positivist perception that the court had the task of finding 
the true law, as though that constituted an inquiry into an issue of fact. 
Prior to 1969, Zimbabwe’s courts and legislation adopted an analogous 
approach. Two statutes provided for courts that might hear cases affected 
by customary law. The Native Law and Courts Act 193723 provided that 
Chiefs might hear civil cases. Since the Chiefs presumably knew the 
customary law, the 1937 Act contained no explicit rules of recognition 
to instruct them to find it. The African Affairs Act,24 which had its 
progenitors in a series of statutes going back to 1927 and before, provided 
that Native Commissioners (later called District Commissioners) would 
try civil cases between Africans. It provided no statutory guide to the 
ascertainment of customary law. Case law, however, developed a rule 
similar to Angu v Attah. In Matambo v Matambo,25 a dispute arose 
over the distribution of a deceased’s estate. The Appellate Division (now 
the Supreme Court) faced the issue whether the applicable customary law 
entitled somebody besides the eldest son of the decedent’s senior wife to 
share in the estate.
The court stated:
This seems to me to be a matter which requires the most careful 
investigation, an investigation which can only be conducted by 
hearing witnesses who are experts in this matter and who are in 
a position to give their views on what the Vakaranga custom 
is.26
The court evidently assumed that only one true version of Vakaranga 
custom existed. Just as courts in the positivist tradition everywhere, it 
perceived the judicial task as discovering the true law.
No system of law, however, can operate successfully if in every case
22 Angu v Attah  (1916) PC (1874-1928) 43 (unreported), cited in A.E.W. Park, The Sources o f  
Nigerian Law (1963), p. 83.
23 No. 23 of 1937.
24' Cap. 228.
25' 1969 (3) SA 717 (RAD).
“ ■ Ibid. p. 719.
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the parties must prove what law animates the community. As a South 
African court stated in 1929: “ If we were to insist on every usage and 
practice being proved by evidence, as we prove trade and other customs 
in our courts, it may render the application of native usage and practice 
unworkable, for then native cases might become too expensive and too 
protracted.” 27
If a court knows the law, and the parties do not challenge its statement 
of it, of course no need exists for the court to inform itself about it. The 
parties need to introduce evidence only when they disagree over the 
appropriate major premise that the court ought properly to apply in 
deciding the case. Only then must the court make a choice of law.
Like the Native Commissioners themselves, the then Rhodesian regime 
fondly believed that its Commissioners knew all about customary law. The 
1969 Act, substantially repeated in 1981 with important procedural 
changes, therefore provided that it need consider what it called a “ source” 
of law only in cases where “ the court entertains any doubt as to the 
existence or content of a rule of customary law . . . ’,28 It put into 
statutory form the central teaching of Angu v Attah.M Originally 
developed to instruct judges ignorant about customary law o f its content, 
the system of “ proving” customary law to judges ignorant of even “ clear 
case” customary law became the basic rule of recognition not for clear 
cases but for trouble cases.
Section 5 in its 1969 version stated that, if the judge was in doubt 
as to the applicable rules — i.e. if the case at hand constituted a trouble 
case — the court should consider “ such submissions thereon as may be 
made by or on behalf of the parties”  (emphasis added). It might then
. . . consult reported cases, textbooks and other sources, and 
may receive opinions either orally or in writing, to enable it to 
arrive at a decision in the matter.
B. The Inconsistency between Zimbabwe’s Customary Law Trouble
Case Rules o f Recognition and the Positivist Perception
With regard to general law, 1 argue that the contradictory nature of the 
rules of precedent and statutory interpretation demonstrated that they 
could not serve to discover “ true law” . They only make sense of the realist 
perception.
In the positivist perception, one true law exists animating the minds 
and behaviour of society’s members. If so, then it becomes subject to 
proof, just as one might prove the existence of a public right of way across 
private land. If only one true custom exists, the “ sources”  of law 
mentioned by the statute, however, constitute, plainly silly ways of proving 
it. *29
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The principal rule of recognition, embodied in section 5 of the 1969 
Act, defined specific “ sources”  of law: reported cases, textbooks and 
opinions “ orally or in writing” . In the positivist view, these constituted 
not “ sources”  of law but evidence of a fact — that a particular rule of 
law animated the minds and motivated the behaviour of the people 
involved. They constituted, however, strange “ evidence” of a fact at issue 
between the parties. Ordinarily, if A sues B, a proposition about a matter 
of fact that the judge finds in that litigation binds only A and B. Section 
5, however, makes a rule of customary law announced in a case between 
A and B somehow a “ source”  of law in a case between C and D. If that 
constitutes binding evidence of the rule of law as a “ fact” , it does so 
uniquely in our jurisprudence. Aghin ordinarily, a witness cannot report 
hearsay — what an out-of-court declarant said in order to prove the truth 
of a proposition about a matter of fact contained in the out-of-court 
statement. Section 5, however, admits as a “ source”  of law textbooks, 
notoriosly based on hearsay, sometimes many times confounded. By what 
magic does hearsay become especially reliable because somebody labels 
it a textbook? If one textbook disagrees with another, should a court 
analyse the true law — a matter for debate amongst social scientists? If 
two witnesses of equal credibility disagree about the existence or content 
of a rule of customary law, should a presiding officer try to determine 
what constitutes the true law on the footing that one witness had the greater 
credibility? The positivist perception holds that there exists in the minds 
and behaviour of the people one and only one “ true”  rule of customary 
law. If that were true, section 5 constituted a strange way of proving it.
If, on the other hand, the relist perception be true, that contradictory 
rules of customary law frequently exist in the minds and behaviour of 
different sections of the people, then section 5 made good sense. Section 
5 in effect taught that of course one should expect that contradictory rules 
will often appear. It instructed the judge, however, that neither a party 
nor the court might invent a rule of customary law out of whole cloth. 
It embodied a sensible rule of recognition in customary law trouble cases: 
a major premise becomes permissible if, but only if, it has a lawful source. 
Section 5 stated some of the lawful sources: reported cases, textbooks, 
opinions. As in general law, it constituted a rule to identify a genuine 
trouble case, not a rule to decide it. Viewed from the positivist perspective, 
section 5 opposed everything lawyers know about evidence and proof. 
Viewed from the realist perspective, it stated a straightforward and 
reasonable rule.
C . How the Old Courts o f  Appeal for Customary Law 
Manipulated the Rules o f  Recognition to Maximise Their 
Power
Realists hold that, in a trouble case, to search for the true law constitutes 
a search for the. chimera. Since, like the chimera, in such a case, no true 
law exists, like the supposed discovery of the chimera, the true law must 
exist only in the eye of the beholder. To follow the dictates of the rules 
of recognition for trouble cases as though they constituted rules of
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recognition for a clear case (in which true law does exist) empowers the 
judge to create law under the guise of finding it. That maximises the non- 
accountable power of the judiciary over the content of customary law — 
a power enhanced by other provisions of the 1969 Act. 1 begin by discussing 
two of these additional provisions: the procedure prescribed by the Act, 
and the power to declare a rule void for repugnancy to justice and good 
conscience.
1. Procedural Provisions
The 1969 Act made minimal provisions for a party’s participation 
in the decision about the law. The party could make “ submissions”  to 
the court about the law. The court had to advise a party about the 
authorities consulted. The court aloqe, however, decided whose opinions 
about the law to consult. It could receive the opinions of a particular Chief 
(or, frequently, the court messenger) in writing, without exposing the 
opinion to cross-examination. It could refuse to hear a witness offered 
by an opposing party. The court, not the parties, controlled the inputs 
to the process of deciding the existence and content of customary law.
2. Repugnancy
Until 1981, the court retained discretion to ignore a rule of customary 
law on the grounds that it seemed “ repugnant to natural justice or 
morality” . The Rhodesian courts never managed to give those words much 
content. In an often quoted statement, in 1922, Tredgold SRJ wrote:
The only question is whether the custom . . . , is “ repugnant to 
natural justice or morality” . . . whatever those words mean. I 
consider that they apply only to such customs as inherently 
impress us with abhorrence or are obviously immoral in their 
incidence.30 3
So vague a statement obviously endowed the courts with a powerful tool 
to nullify a rule of customary law that the white judges found distasteful.
In Sitwala and Ndoza v Lizwe31 the Chief and other councilors at 
Bubi (an Ndebele area) approved a statement of Ndebele custom:
According to Ndebele custom, when a pregnant girl reports her 
pregnancy to her lover and he denied responsibility, the matter 
is left until the child is born. Then the old people come together 
and the indicated lover is called and the child identified. If the 
child is stillborn there can be no truth arrived at in the 
identification. In a case such as this no action for damages 
would arise. If, however, the lover admitted responsibility an 
action for damages would arise.
30' Chiduku v Chidano, 1922 SR 55; see also Vela v Mosdinika and Magutsa, 1936 ST 171, 174;
Chakan v Coro 11928-1962) SRN 980 <1959).
3I- [1928-1962] SRN 341 (1946).
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O f that custom, the President of the Native Appeals Court stated that 
“ we doubt the correctness of the native custom relied on by the defendant, 
and in any case we reject in on the grounds that to uphold it would 
manifestly be contra bonos mores”.31 Why the custom seemed 
“ abhorrent”  or “ obviously immoral”  does not appear.
3. The Use o f  Precedent
In general, the old appellate courts for customary law cases played 
ducks and drakes with precedent. Two examples may suffice. In Nagareve 
v. Finhai and Dzingwai,32 3 *35a case from Umtali, the question arose of how 
much lobolo the parents of the divorced wife might retain on account of 
each child born of the marriage. Two witnesses testified that, amongst 
Africans in Umtali (a Shona area), no hard and fast rule existed concerning 
the amount of lobolo that a father might offset for each child. Two other 
witnesses, however, asserted that “ it is generally accepted amongst natives 
of the Umtali district that two head of cattle or $20 is the normal ‘value’ 
in terms of rovoro (i.e. lobolo) of a child ” , although, the rule did not 
fix that amount rigidly. To resolve the differences between the witnesses, 
the court cited eight reported cases from Amandas, Chinhoyi, Mazowe, 
Harare, Shurugwi, Goromonzi, Marondera and Mutare itself — that is 
from all over Mashonaland. They ranged in time from 1935 to 1952, a 
period in which a marked change in the value of cattle had occured. These 
cases made varying decisions about the amount deductible on accout of 
a child. The single precedent from Mutare did deduct two head per child 
— exactly what one witness testified remained the rule. The court could 
as easily have stated that the Mutare case confirmed the witness who agreed 
with it. Instead, becuase of the conflict in these eight cases, the court 
decided that from the evidence (which went both ways) “and past decisions 
of the Native Appeals Court” no hard and fast rule existed. Under the 
guise of finding law, the court created it.
Again, in Lesotom v EngasP4 a case of defamation arising in 
Harare, a metropolitan area, the court cited a case arising in Wedza ( a 
Shona rural area) in 1938,33a case arising in Bulawayo (an Ndebele area) 
in 1950,36 and a case from Goromonzi (a Shona area) in 1962.37
4. Textbooks
The 1969 Act, like the 1981 Act, specifies that a court may use 
textbooks as a “ source” of customary law. In the early days the court 
tended to rely heavily upon Bullock, The Mashona. (The President of the 
Court and Chief Native Commissioner during the 1930s, Mr C. Bullock, 
the book’s author, tended to cite it especially frequently.) More recently
32' Ibid. p. 343.
33’ [1928-1962] SRN 765 (1955).
34, Lesotom v Envasi, 1966 AAC 36.
35' Marufu v Ephraim [1937-1962] SRN 40 (1938).
36’ Quegule v Nawu [1937-1962] SRN 253 (1950).
37 Antonio v Romos [1962] SRN 1.
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the court has cited Holleman, Shona Customary Law (1960), Child, The 
History and Extent o f  Recognition o f  Tribal Law in Rhodesia (2nd edn.
1965), Goldin and Gelfand^African Law and Custom in Rhodesia (1975), 
and Storry, Customary Law in Practice (1979).
The courts have sometimes treated these works as though enacted by 
a legislature as a code of law. In Mativenga and Mamire v. Chinamura,3* 
the court decided that a father ought to respond in damages for the delicts 
of his son. It so decided entirely on the basis of statements made in 
Holleman’s work. In Mombeshora v Chirume,39 the court warned 
against so slavish a use of textbooks. It stated: “ Dr Holleman’s researches 
were conducted mainly in the Wedza district and did not include modern 
urban communities, where the idea of a father controlling the wealth of 
the entire family, as was the basis of the old customary law, is no longer 
as prevalent as it used to be.” 40 Well might it so warn. In an earlier time, 
the court repeatedly referred to Whitfield’s South African Native Law to 
prove a custom in Zimbabwe.41 42
•5. Witnesses
The District Officers apparently learned about local custom in 
somewhat informal ways. In Chingwenyiso v Chitema and Munyai,42 one 
stated with nice candour that “ the question of reducing the lobolo on 
account of deceased children is debatable, but local opinion in the person 
of native messengers resident in Bushu Reserve and other natives resident 
in this Reserve, support the reduction. I consulted them before making 
my award.”  Occasionally, the expert witnesses consulted disagreed with 
each other. When they did, the court sometimes resolved the difference 
by reference to the reported cases. In Kapisi v Magwayi (a Makoni 
case),43 the Native Commissioner heard oral evidence from two witnesses. 
They disagreed about the existence of a custom permitting the father of 
an unmarried girl to have custody on paying a “ third beast”  for 
maintenance. The court resolved the conflict by reliance on a 1929 case 
from Shamva. In the 1929 case the court had held that the father o f the 
baby could receive custody only if the father of the mother agreed to accept 
the payment.44 In that 1929 case, the court cited no authority for the rule, 
but merely stated, apparently on the basis of judicial notice, that “ the 
payment of mombeyo kurere is not a right which can be demanded by 
the appellant. Under native custom it was subject to acceptance by the 
father or guardian of the woman seduced.”45 In the end, in Kapisi’s case, 
despite the conflict in the evidence, the court chose one rather than the 
other rule because an ealier judge had simply asserted the “ native custom” .
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3S- [1928-1962] SRN 829 (1958).
39. [1971] AAC 30.
40 Ibid. p.45.
41, See e.g. Silavi v Lonacaia and Mhtahla[ 1928-19(52] SRN 28 (1931).
42' [1928-1962] SRN 65 (1935).
43' [1928-1962] SRN 90 (1937).
44 Anderson v. M am a  [1928-1962] SRN 19 (1929).
43, Ibid, p.20; see also Nagareve's case,supra n. 33.
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I have found no case in which the court subjected a witness to rigorous 
cross-examination upon his testimony about the customary law. For 
example, in Hlomani v Majayi and Mawengi, 46 Hlomani, an insane 
person, killed one of his children and attempted to murder another child 
still in his wife’s womb. The appeal court ordered that the Native 
Commissioner enquire about Shangaan customary law on the right of the 
father to custody of the surviving child after birth. A headman testified 
in part that under Shangaan law as it was “ before the white man took 
over this country” :
If a man killed his child, or attempted to do so, he would have 
been killed. If he left any other children by the mother of the 
child he had killed, those children would be given to the mother 
and the mother’s guardian. The relations of the husband who 
had killed his child would get nothing. The lobolo paid for the 
wife would be divided by the Chief, and the Chief would keep 
ha lf and the remaining half would be left with the guardian of 
the mother of the child . . . Since the arrival of the white man 
we have changed as regards the lobolo but we do not give him 
the child. The child belongs to the mother . . .  If the husband 
was provoked to be mad when he killed his child it makes no 
difference to any surviving child. It would still be given to the 
mothers’s people . . .
Two other witnesses testified to the same effect. Nobody asked any of 
the witnesses whether they had ever actually observed a case of that sort, 
or how they had acquired their knowledge. It seems doubtful that many 
fathers had killed a child and then demanded custody of the remaining 
child. Without cases of that sort, how could the witness have known what 
they claimed to know?
6. Judicial Notice
Mostly, however, the courts simply announced customary law, 
apparently on a theory of judicial notice. That, combined with the respect 
the court had for its own precedent, meant that what some judges thought 
constituted the customary law frequently became the law for all time and 
all places. In Soffa and Hilda v Gondwe,* 47 an action for defamation, the 
court relied upon a - 1938 case48 for the proposition that defamation 
constitutes an actionable wrong, but that no action will lie “ if the words 
used were addressed to any person in authority in good faith and not with 
express malice; words spoken lightly or in heated quarrel and later 
withdrawn should not form the basis of an action, nor should common 
abuse” .49 The earlier case, however, did not even purport to represent the 
custom that actually obtained. There, the court stated:
[1928-1962] SRN 43 (1933).
47' [1928-1962] SRN 331 (1946).
Marufu v. Ephraim [1928-1962] SRN 115 (1938).
*• [1928-1962] SRN 331, 333 (1946).
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This Appeal Court has no doubt that an action for slander does 
lie in the Native law of Southern Rhodesia. The plaint used is 
“ He must whiten my name” . In stating this the Court would 
wish to reconcile this dictum with circumstances now obtaining 
in Native life by stating that words spoken lightly or in a heated 
quarrel and later withdrawn should not form the basis of an 
action, nor should common abuse.
Again, it did not state what circumstances forced that amendment to the 
law. The court in the earlier case also relied upon Natal law, that 
defamation constituted an actionable wrong “ provided that no action will 
lie if the words used were addressed to any person in authority in good 
faith, and not with express malice” .’0
7. Summary
In the past, the appellate courts supplemented the repugnancy clause 
by manipulating the rules of recognition to impose judicial control over 
the content o f customary law. They controlled the persons whose opinions 
they would hear, and the texts they would consult, but principally they 
manipulated precedent, the use of textbooks, witnesses and judicial notice 
to create a law that could have resembled the law of the people only in 
its grosser outlines. They inevitably imposed their values upon the law, 
but in most cases without explicating them. In the following section we 
see how this warped the law in two areas: the right of damages for adultery 
by a wife of an unregistered marriage, and the burden and quantum of 
proof in adultery and seduction cases.
D. The Warping o f Customary Law in Adultery and Seduction 
Cases
1. Adultery and the Unregistered Marriage
In Shona law, courts have always awarded a wronged husband 
damages for his wife’s adultery. In Shona law, of course, that meant that 
a husband validly married by Shona law should receive damages from the 
adulterer. The Native Marriages Act 195050 1 provided that a marriage not 
registered with the Native Commissioner did not constitute a “ valid” 
marriage. A husband by a marriage according to Shona law, but which 
he had failed to register, sued for damages for his wife’s adultery.52 The 
court denied the claim:
The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines adultery as “ voluntary 
sexual intercourse of a married person with one of opposite sex, 
married or not” . It will therefore be seen that to constitute the 
offence of adultery the essential requirement is that one of the 
parties shall be married and this postulates the existence of a 
legitimate marriage.
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**• No. 27 of 1950, later the African Marriages Act (Cap. 137) s. 3.
5I- Tarisayi » Tayongwa (1954] SRN 61.
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Since the plaintiff did not have a “ valid” marriage, he could not recover 
for adultery. The Concise Oxford Dictionary hardly seems the best source 
of Shona customary law. The court obviously made a significant policy 
decision about the content of Shona law, not on the basis of criteria 
appropriate to the policy choice it made, but on criteria unrelated to it.
2. Burden o f  Proof in Seduction and Adultery Cases
In Shona customary law, it seems that the woman’s confession of 
adultery naming the seducer (frequently when in labour), or her action 
in striking the adulterer or seducer with her under-apron, constituted 
strong, practically irrefutable evidence of who commited the seduction 
or the adultery. In a remarkable series of cases the appellate courts reversed 
this presumption, and then, years later, doubled back on their tracks. In 
1938, the majority of the court apparently held that ‘the circumstances 
disclosed did not constitute sufficient corroboration of the woman’s 
confession” .53 In the same year the court stated:”  . . .  the Appeal Court 
considers it desirable to record its view that, in modern circumstances when 
many natives are sufficiently sophisticated to take advantage [of the custom 
that the woman’s striking a man with her apron constitutes sufficient 
evidence of adultery], it cannot accept this action as an irrebutable 
presumption.” 54 In 1940 , the court made the same assertion about a 
“ labour pains accusation” .55 In the same year, the court went further 
and held that the custom of striking the adulterer with an under-apron 
“ should in these days be accepted as corroboration with great 
reservations” .56 In 1942, the court rejected an adultery case for lack of 
proof, one judge stating that the record did not contain “ proof of adultery 
beyond a reasonable doubt” .57 In that case the court knew well that it 
went beyond customary law. One judge stated: “ In this case the accusation 
has not been proved beyond any do ub t. . .  I know that this attitude gives 
the Chiefs from whom appeals arise serious cause for thought. Their line 
is that a woman should not complain unles she had been seduced and it 
is difficult to convince them that this one-sided evidence cannot be accepted 
by us.” 58 By 1946, the standard had become sufficient corroboration to 
“ leave no room for doubt” .59
By 1955, the burden of proof had become “ the same as is required” 
in a criminal case60 Thus did the court completely reverse the customary 
law on the subject, and all without one word discussing the policies behind 
the.burden of proof in such cases. It reached that result by manipulation 
of the rules of recognition. It could do that because it treatd the customary 
law as “ true” law. Searching for the true law, it could let its creativity 
run free. In 1972, the court called the new rule requiring corroboration
53' Nyamina v Samson (1928-1962) SRN 96 (1938). The quotation appears in the headnote, not 
the text, but in this period the reporters did not request the entire judgement in every case.
54 Makonsenkeyi v Poradzanvi (1928-1962) SRN 117 (1938).
55' Makavengavise v. Davidson (1928-1962) SRN 163 (1940).
56 Joshua v Fani (1928-1962) SRN 180., 182 (1940).
57 Ginger v Kamjgariwa (1928-1972) SRN 277 (1942).
58 Ibid. p. 278.
59 Idi v Mabala |1928-1962)SRN 768 (1955).
60 Madinga v Mudhliwo (1928-1962) SRN 768 (1955).
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“ an alien importation (from South African civil law] which was of 
doubtful value even in its original system” , and **a source of discontent 
to the people fin our system of customary law)” .61 *
E. Summary
The all white, all male, courts that decided appeals in cases involving 
customary law inevitably determined the existence and content of the rules 
o f customary law by which they decided the cases that came before them. 
In general (with the striking exception of Judge Pittman) they adopted 
a positivist perspective. Aided by the procedural rules that gave them 
complete jower over the “ sources”  they would consult, and the 
repugnancy rule, the rules or recognition of customary law trouble cases, 
percieved as a search for “ true”  law, inevitably gave them inscrutable, 
unaccountable power to determine the content of customary law. In the 
colonial situation, the rules in effect gave the white District Commissioners 
and appellate judges power to decide the customary law. Thus did the 
rules of recognition play a pan  in creating a legal order in which a tiny 
minority of whites controlled the destinies of'Zimbabwe’s population.
VI. CUSTOMARY LAW TROUBLE CASE RULE OF 
RECOGNITION: 1981 AND AFTER
THE 1981 Act^ made some modifications in the language of rules of 
recognition for customary law. I argue here that that language and the 
whole spirit of that Act require a transformation of the court’s perspective 
from positivism to realism, from a system of a choice of law that 
maximised the autocratic, unaccountable and inscrutable power of the 
courts to one in which it shares power with the litigants. 1 will examine, 
first the* changes wrought by the 1981 Act; second, the use of precedents, 
textbooks, witnesses and judicial notice under the new Act; and third, a 
suggestion for an appropriate agenda for deciding between alternative 
permissible claims of law.
A. The Changes Wrought by the 1981 Act
The 1981 Act made two significant changes that affect the chioce of law. 
First, it changed the appeal institutions. It abolished the court of appeal for 
customary law cases, providing an appeal route that went through a District 
Court (i.e. a magistrate warranted as a District Court) to the Supreme 
Court.63 No longer will administrative officers — District Commissioners 
or former Native Commissioners — make up two thirds of the appeals 
court. From now on, appeals on issues of customary law will fall for 
decision before a court all of whose members have judicial independence. 
They will have their own biases, of course, but at least political and 
administrative necessity will not play a dominant role.
61- Masemburo » Ya*o [1972] AAC 28.
63i Customary La* and Primary Courts Act 1981 (No. A ot 1981).
63. s. 20.
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Secondly, the new section 5 specifically permits the parties to submit 
evidence to the court. The old Act required the trial court to consider the 
“ submissions”  of a party. Now it requires it to consider as well the 
“ evidence”  he tenders.*4 The old Act empowered the court alone to 
determine the persons whose opinions it would “ consult” .65 The new Act 
only gives it the power to determine the persons whose opinions are to 
be “ relied upon” .** In short, in the ealier Act the court had the power 
to decide a disputed issue of customary law without hearing more than 
the party’s claim. Now it must also listen to its evidence. The old Act gave 
the court autocratic power. Now the court must to a degree share that 
power with the litigants.
B. The Fundamental Rule o f Recognition
The 1981 Act embodied a clear legislative purpose generally to increase 
litigant participation in the decision-making process,67 and specifically 
with respect to choice of law. What constitutes a sensible set of rules of 
recognition for customary law trouble cases that will achieve that purpose? 
As we have seen, the “ sources”  specified in section 3 war with positivist 
principles. Moreover, positivist principles maximise the judges’ power over 
choice of law. Because the reasons for choosing one major premise over 
the other remains inscrutable, the litigants have no way of addressing the 
issues that the court in fact addresses. To meet the Act’s power-sharing 
purposes, the rules must base themselves on the realist perception that, 
in a genuine trouble case, of course alternative permissible rules exist 
between which the court must choose. Based on that perception, the rules 
of recognition must provide a device for assuring the court that both 
alternative major premises in some sense reflect a tendency in society with 
respect to the “ existence of content of a rule of customary law” , and 
provide criteria for making the policy choice between them. Only so can 
the parties meaningfully provide inputs for judicial decision, and therefore, 
in a sense, participate in it.
In a trouble case, the several sources or law yield alternative major 
premises to control the lawsuit. Unless a party can point to an authorised 
“ source” of law to evidence his claimed rule, a court cannot consider it. 
We may state these fundamental concepts as rules of recognition:
1. A court may assert as a rule of law to control a lawsuit 
only a rule evidenced by a lawful “ source” of law.
1.1 If the various “ sources” of law evidence only a single 
rule, the court shall adopt that rule to control the lawsuit.
1.2 If the various sources of law evidence more than one rule, 





«. 5 (a ) . 
s. 5 (a). 
Supra.
A source may evidence a rule with strong persuasive effect. On the other 
hand, the evidence may so far fail from persuading the court that it 
represents even a tendency in the area involved, that a court ought not 
to  have the power to choose it over a contrary claim. Therefore
1.3 A court may assert as a rule of law to control a lawsuit 
only a rule that the sources of law evidence as likely to 
exist at least as a tendency in the customary law of the 
area concerned.
In the following section I discuss the various sources of law, and put 
forward rules of recognition relating to “ permissibility” . In the final 
section, I discuss the choice between competing major premises.
C. The "Sources o f  Customary Law”: The Rules that Identify a
Claimed Rule as Permissible
1. Decided Cases
In general law, published case reports embody the common law. A 
rule exists in the book, or it does not exist. By contrast, customary law 
does not exist in the books. It exists in the minds and behaviour of the 
people concerned. What weight ought a court to give a precedent of 
customary law? To answer that question we must first determine what 
a precedent case of that sort decides.
In so far as a judgement decides a trouble case, it chooses between 
two alternative permissible major premises. In a customary law case, to 
denote a major premise as “ permissible” means that it exists as a tendency 
in the community — that is, that some proportion of the community have 
it in their minds and reflect it in their behaviour as a rule of customary 
law. Every customary law appellate case must embody a judicial finding 
that at the time and place that the case arose, at least some part of the 
community adhered to the rule announced in the decision. Unless it did, 
the earlier court could not have selected that rule as the major premise 
for the precedent. We suggest that a precedent case sufficiently evidences 
the rule of customary, law for which it stands to make that rule 
“ permissible” . We can, therefore, state our second rule of recognition:
2. A court may select as a major premise a rule of 
customary law evidenced by a reported case.
A case, however, can only evidence a rule for the time and place in 
which the facts of that case arose. In general law, one can always 
distinguish a precedent on the ground that, after the earlier decision, the 
legislature enacted a new statute affecting the issue. In customary law, 
if serves to distinguish a precedent that it laid down a rule for another 
time or place. It will not do to cite a case arising in Mashonaland (and, 
therefore, presumably deciding an issue of Shona law) as a precedent to 
evidence the existence of a rule of Ndebele law. We can therefore, state 
two corollaries to rule 2:
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2.1 The more remote in place, the more weakly a precedent 
evidences a rule of customary law.
2.2 The more remote in time, the more weakly a precedent 
evidences a rule of customary law.
Corollary 2.2. undercuts many of the older cases in the reports. It suggests 
that a court may at best warily assume that these still represent even a 
tendency in customary law today.
A precedent, however, does more than evidence that the rule it 
announces at one time and place existed at least as a tendency in society. 
In a trouble case, the court must choose between alternative permissible 
major premises. Presented with a choice between the same permissible 
major premises as the appellate court faced in the precedent, of course 
the appellate court’s choice ought to have binding effect. A choice of that 
sort constitutes a policy decision by the appellate court. It would become 
intolerable to have every court making its own policy choices.
Therefore:
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2.3 A precedent decision binds a lower court in so far as it 
faces a choice between the same alternative major 
premises as did the court in the precedent case.
2. Textbooks
As did the old statute, section 5 of the new Act specifies textbooks 
as a source .of customary law. Therefore:
3. A court may select as a major premise a rule of 
customary law evidenced by a textbook.
The textbooks available in Zimbabwe as reference works on customary 
law have different standings as evidence of customary law. They fall into 
two groups. Some represent independent field work by trained 
anthropologists — Bourdillon, The Shona, and Holleman, Shona 
Customary Law, for example. Others, compiled by civil servants, only 
piit together the cases of the former appellate courts for customary law 
cases — Child, The History and Event o f  Recognition o f Tribal Law in 
Rhodesia, and Storry, Customary Law in Practice, for example. The latter, 
which do no more than rationalise the cases, only report custom as the 
appellate courts have declared it. Self-evidently, the latter can have no 
higher probative value than the cases upon which it rests. A court ought 
to rely on the cases, not on Child’s or Storry’s interpretation of the cases.
Therefore:
3.1 A textbook cannot have a higher evidentiary value that 
the data base on which it rests.68
u. See supra text accompanying n 39.
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Several corollaries flow from that proposition:
3.1.1 The evidentiary weight of a textbook becomes less the 
more remote its data base in time.69
3.1.2 The evidentiary weight of a textbook becomes less the 
more remote its data base geographically.70
Finally, a court should examine a textbook as a textbook, not as a code 
of law. Codes of law embody the law. Because<hey do, every word has 
enormous significance. A whole tribe of lawyers serve as parliamentary 
draftsmen, devoted to the art of putting words into laws so that they will 
suffer as few ambiguities as human contrivance can manage. Scholars, 
on the other hand, have a different sort of meaning to convey to their 
readers. Courts should read a textbok sympathetically, trying to understand 
it as would a scholar, not a lawyer analysing a code.
3. Witnesses
Witnesses too constitute a source of law. The same rule applies to 
them as reported cases and textbooks:
4. A court may select as a major premise a rule of 
customary law evidenced by a witness’s testimony.
The rule that applies to the weight that a court should accord a witness’s 
testimony tracks the rules concerning the weight it should accord to a 
textbook or a reported case:
4.1 A witness’s testimony about a rule of customary law can 
have no higher evedentiary value than the witness’s 
opportunity and capacity to learn of the rule, his capacity 
to remember and to report it, and his veracity.
4. The Judge’s Own Knowledge
In most cases, the presiding officer will have some knowledge about 
the applicable rule of law. Therefore:
5. A court may select as a major premise a rule of customary 
law which he of his own knowledge knows exists as a rule 
of customary law in at least a portion of the community.
Particularly because the judge holds that opinion, he must take care 
to warn himself about his sources of knowledge — his data base. Does 
it truly warrant a finding that the rule exists in at least a portion of the 
community?
69, Bullock, The Mashona, has for tliis reason fallen intd disuse.
70' See supra text accompanying n 39
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5.1 A judge’s own knowledge about a rule of customary law 
can have no higher evidentiary value than his own 
opportunity and capacity to learn of the rule, and to 
remember and report it.
A judge’s own knowledge of a rule constitutes at best one possible source 
of the rule. That a witness testifies to any alternative possible rule, or that 
the cases or textbook mention another, proves not that either the judge 
or the alternative source must err, but that two alternative permissible rules 
exist. That they exist demostrates only that the judge has on his hands 
a trouble case. In a trouble case, a court must choose between alternative 
permissible major premises. That one of those alternative major premises 
has as its source the judge’s own knowledge does not necessarily make 
that rule more or less authoritative, or better, than a rule derived from 
reported cases, textbooks or witnesses. The court cannot avoid the 
responsibility of choosing. In the final section of this article, I discuss 
briefly the criteria of choice.
D . The Criteria o f  Choice between Permissible Alternative Rules o f
Law
Rule 1 sets forth the basic rule of recognition for customary law cases. 
Rules 2-5 set forth the rules that make a claimed major premise 
“ permissible” . Rule 1.2 requires a court to choose between the alternative 
rules evidenced by the sources of law. By what criteria ought a court to 
choose?
The realist perspective holds that because conflicts exist within society, 
conflicts will ineluctably exist in many aspects of customary law. The rules 
proposed here reflect that ineluctable conflict. Rules 2,3,4, and 5 all state 
that a court may use as a major premise to control a lawsuit — that is, 
it may assert as a rule of customary law — only a rule evidenced by one 
of the four sources identified. Our theory tells us to expect that these 
sources may evidence contradictory potential rules, for our theory asserts 
that society embodies not consensus but conflict. It does violence to our 
theory to try to discover which of these contradictory rules most likely 
constitutes the “ true”  law. However positive a witness, however detailed 
a textbook, however fixed in his mind a judge’s knowledge of the law, 
like the blind man examining the elephant, none of them err in reporting 
different rules of customary law. In his description of the elephant, a blind 
man only errs by insisting that the elephant is like a long snake, or the 
broad leaf of a flower, or a whiskbroom, or a tree trunk. The elephant 
constitutes all of these — trunk, ear, tail and legs. Each blind man tells 
the truth, but only part of the truth. By insisting that he alone accurately 
describes the elephant, each tells falsehood. So each source of customary 
law mav correctlv evidence a rule of customarv law to which a nnrtinn
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A court must therefore, make a choice between alternative permissible 
rules, not on the footing that one constitutes true law and the other false 
law, but on the footing that one constitutes better law than the other. The 
court cannot avoid making a policy choice. By what criteria ought it to 
make that choice?
Three different sort# of criteria suggests themselves: equity; the purity 
of customary law; and the public interest. We discuss each of these in turn.
1. Equity
A decision by a court creates a precedent. It lays down a rule that 
to a degree will affect future cases and future behaviour of members of 
the community. On the other hand, a case involves a dispute between two 
quite specific parties. A form of natural law school of jurisprudence asserts 
that a court should decide a case in accordance with its sense of what will 
do justice between the parties.71
That proposition conceals too much. Our notions of doing equity 
between the parties conceal norms prescribing behaviour and embodying 
value judgements: a court should favour widows and orphans over soulless 
corporations; the party with the deepest pocket should pay; or even that 
tiny, white-haired middle-class white ladies have a greater claim for equity 
than scruffy, young male blacks. Once explicitly stated, a court can 
consider in what sense norms like these make sense. Left covered by the 
blanket of “ equity” , however, they do not emerge into the daylight for 
consideration.72
2. The Purity o f Customary Law
In the footprints of von Savigny and the historical school of 
jurisprudence, some perceive customary law as the expression of the 
African Volksgeist, or common conciousness.73 In that view, that rule of 
customary law seems the best that has the longest provenance, or which 
best fits into the logical structure of customary law.
Customary law, like all law, however, grew out of a particular social 
situation. It serves the needs of particular groups in historic time and 
historic place. In general, it arose in response to social problems posed 
by a society with a relatively low level of specialisation and exchange, with 
relatively little communication between groups or with the great world
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72 In Miki v. Emely and Mbgadzsawa [1928-1962] S.R.N. 591, the court held that the
determination of the amount of lobolo that a father-in-law had to return on a divorce rested 
on a number o f different factors. “ In all it appears that by taking all these factors into 
consideration it is really a  matter of equity, in other words, what the presiding officer, with 
few exceptions, considers equitable according to the facts presented to him in each particular 
case*’ (p.592). Self-evidently, that permits each case to take as its measure the length of the 
presiding officer’s foot.
See e.g. Allott, “ The Future o f African Law” , in African Law: Adaptation and Development 
(Kuper and Kuper (Eds.), 1965), p.216.
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outside, based primarily on kin relationships.74 The great phrase “ from 
status to contract’’ suggests how the law of those societies changes under 
conditions of capitalism; a further transition, from contract to plan, seems 
at present to be under way.75 To hold that the best law is the oldest law, 
or that law which best harmonises with customary law as a whole. 
j rondemns those subject to customary law to social organisation 
appropriate to a far from modern society. For example, customary law 
in some respects treated w om an a t  prngerty. That may have made sense 
in an agricultural society based on hoe agriculture. Does it make sense 
in independent Zimbabwe? To say that in new Zimbabwe women ought 
to have same status that they had in old Rhodesia (or even before) denies 
the potential for beneficient change.
3. The Public Interest
A third possible criterion for choice between alternative permissible 
rules (or major premises) exists: to choose that rule whose consequences 
for society seems most likely to advance the public interest. As a basic 
rule of recognition that conforms to the notion that the rule that a judge 
selects as the major premise for a lawsuit, so far as the doctrine of 
precedent allows, will affect future cases. The rule a judgement anounces 
becomes one element in an individual’s arena of choice. To that extent, 
it may change repetitive patterns of behaviour. Society by definition 
consists of the repetitive patterns of behaviour of the individuals who live 
in it. The choice of a rule in a trouble case, to the extent that it changes 
behaviour, changes society. A judge must regard the consequences of his 
choice on social behaviour. Therefore:
6. In choosing between alternative permissible rules of law to 
control a lawsuit, a court should choose that law whose 
consequences will best advance the public interest.
Self-evidently,' that hardly says very much, (at least it frees us from 
the unseen hands of natural law and of historical jurisprudence). The realist 
perspective explicitly holds that society embodies conflict, not consensus. 
In making choices as that model requires, whose notion of the public 
interest ought a judge to adopt as a guide?
I will not attempt here to answer that question in detail. I do assert 
that “ one man, one vote” implies that a judge should have in mind the 
interests of the masses against the classes, the many against the few. He 
should choose rules that forward the emancipation of women, advance 
co-operatives and other forms of social ownership, tend to the elimination 
of racism, promote the unity of Zimbabwe’s people, reduce arbitrary and 
discretionary power, enhance democracy and undercut ascriptive place and 
privilege.
74' Seidman, Stale Law and Development (1978), Chap. 11.
75' Seidman, "Law and Development in Anglophonic, Sub-Sahara Africa”  [1966] Wis. L. Rev. 
366.
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During the long period in which white males decided about the content 
of Zimbabwean customary law, one, Judge Pittman, during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s exceptionally adopted a realist, populist perspective. In 
Mombeshora v. Chirume,76 7for example, in Salisbury, the defendant’s 
17-year-old son crashed a car into the plaintiff’s car. In the light of 
Mativenga’s case,”  another, judge might well have merely found the 
father liable for the delict of his son. Judge Pittman, however, held 
otherwise. First, he carefully examined Dr Holleman’s text (on the basis 
of which the earlier court had found against the father), reading it not 
as a code of law but as an anthropological text. He pointed out that “ Dr 
Holleman’s researches were conducted mainly in the Wedza district, and 
it did not include modern urban communities, where the idea of a father 
c, ntrolling the wealth of the entire family, which was the basis of the old 
customary law, is no longer as prevalent as it used to be” .78 He went on 
to say:
The changes in the economic relationship of a family interest 
which have been brought about by Africans entering a cash 
economy and earning money in urban employment have to be 
recognised by this court, so that it will not grow out of touch 
with reality.79
He went on to devise a rule exempting the father from liability for an 
emancipated son and creating a flexible definition of “ emancipated” .
One other example will suffice. In Masembura’s case,80 as we have 
seen, Judge Pittman reversed 34 years of case law during which the 
appellate courts had imposed a requirement of corroboration and a very 
high standard of proof in seduction and adultery cases. Judge Pittman 
first found thatjio  tribe in Zimbabwe “ includes recognition of a need 
for corroboration in seduction cases amongst its judicial practices81 He 
quoted Hoffman82 to the effect that even in South Africa the rule had 
doubtful validity and unnecessary rigidity. Judge Pittman concluded:
It is out of harmony with the modern approach to cautionary 
rules of evidence. Because of its rigidity, it is illogical and it 
may cause as much as it is intended to prevent. Furthermore, 
we believe that its existence in our system of customary law is a 
source of discontent to the people whom that system serves. 
Finally the caution which should always be displayed in 
departing from established law and which is embodied in the 
maxim stare decisis, is of less than usual importance here,
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77' Supra n. 38.
78' [1971] AAC 30, at p. 33.
Ibid.
80 Supra n. 61.
81 • [1972] AAC 28, at pp. 29-30.
82' Hoffman, South African Law o f  Evidence (2nd edn., 3970), pp. 415-416.
71
because no vested rights have grown up under the established
law.83
Judgements of that sort expose the judge’s reasoning to the public view. 
That makes argument by the parties meaningful. It furthers both 
accountability and participation.
VII. CONCLUSION
THIS paper puts forward some proposed rules of recognition for 
customary law trouble cases. In those cases, courts must always select 
between alternative major premises. In the positivist perspective, that 
choice consists of the search for “ true” law, the single rule of customary 
law that animates substantially all the members of the community. In the 
realist perspective, in genuine trouble cases no such consensus exists. 
Society’s dominant characteristic consists not of consensus but of conflict. 
A court should direct its attention not to the search for non-existent “ true 
law” , but for the more just rule. If the positivist perspective holds, then 
the rules of recognition ought to serve the task of providing what rule 
customary law constitutes the social consensus. In fact, the very sources 
named by the statutes deny that perspective. That those sources include 
reported cases and textbooks alone demonstrates that they do not aim at 
finding a single rule of true law. Instead, the statutory sources only make 
sense as evidencing alternative permissible rules. Their true office lies in 
ensuring that a judge does not invent a rule of customary law out of whole 
cloth, thus to depart from his proper role.
Having determined that he cannot avoid choosing between alternative 
permissible rules of customary law, how ought a judge to make that choice? 
Almost self-evidently, the most sensible criterion for that choice lies in 
examining the consequences of the rule for society, and choosing that rule 
that will in future applications favour the mass of the population.
The realist, populist perspective, however, does not arise from the 
individual judge’s consciousness. As we have shown, the Customary Law 
and Primary Courts Act 1981 embodies a change in perspective from one 
of control over the courts by the governing elite to a sharing of power 
between the judiciary and the litigants. With respect to the content of 
customary law, the former elite manipulated the rules of recognition to 
ensure their control over the customary law’s content. I have argued here 
that the new Act requires accountablility by judges for their choice of law. 
With accountability comes the potential for participation in choice of law 
decisions by those subject to the law — and participation constitutes the 
new Act’s principal policy choice. In this as in other aspects, the new Act 
takes first steps towards a fully democratic court system.
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